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IMPROVING COMPARATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
JAMES K. HAMMITT*
Comparative Risk Analysis (CRA) was introduced by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a method for allocating
agency resources across environmental issues.  The purpose of the
initial EPA staff CRA, Unfinished Business,1 and of the follow-up
study by the EPA Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk,2 was to
compare the relative magnitudes of threat posed by environmental
factors under EPA jurisdiction with the agency staff, budget, and at-
tention allocated to each factor.  The initial report found that EPA
resources were not allocated primarily toward what its staff viewed as
the largest risks, but that EPA resource allocations followed public
perceptions of the most significant risks, as determined from pub-
lic-opinion polling.  The CRA study found that hazardous air pollut-
ants, indoor radon, and global-scale issues like climate change and
stratospheric-ozone depletion ranked lower in terms of public per-
ception and agency priority than the agency staff CRA suggested
they should.  Following efforts by Administrators William Ruck-
elshaus and Lee Thomas to orient EPA activities toward risk reduc-
tion, Administrator William Reilly used CRA as a central element in
developing a process of risk-based priority setting within the agency.3
Building on these path-breaking studies, the ten EPA regional
offices, together with many states, municipalities, Indian nations, and
other jurisdictions, have conducted their own CRAs.4  The format of
these exercises has varied substantially, both from the initial EPA ef-
forts and among each other.  In particular, the state and local studies
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REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
12 (1990).
3. See F. Henry Habicht III, EPA’s Vision for Setting National Environmental Priorities,
in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES, 33, 37-41 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994); Charles W. Kent & Fre-
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FIRST?, supra, at 47, 50-53.
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have involved much greater public participation than the EPA stud-
ies.  Whereas the federal EPA studies were conducted by agency staff
and other experts, many of the more recent studies have included
significant numbers of outsiders, including members of the general
public, as well as representatives of industries, environmental advo-
cacy groups, and other “stakeholder” groups.  This shift in participa-
tion appears to reflect the recognition that ranking environmental
risks requires a substantial input of information on human prefer-
ences and values, topics of which risk assessment experts have little
specific expertise.5  It may also reflect a difference in objective, with
the subsequent studies directed more toward developing a political
consensus than were the initial EPA studies.
As reflected in the diversity of approaches undertaken, there is
not yet a consensus on how a CRA should be conducted, which is not
surprising given the recent development of the field and its complex-
ity.  In “Ranking Risks: Some Key Choices”, Clarence J. Davies pro-
vides an overview of some of the key design issues confronting
CRAs.6  To provide useful guidance for conducting a CRA, this arti-
cle examines three critical design issues: (1) what kind of items are
ranked; (2) who participates in the analysis and what information is
used in determining the rankings; and (3) the extent to which rank-
ings should be constrained by economic and other decision-making
principles.  The following section discusses how the choices made
with respect to each of these design issues should depend on the goals
of the CRA.  Whether risks or opportunities for risk reduction should
be the items ranked is discussed in Section II.  Section III considers
what expertise participants in a CRA should have and what informa-
tion should be available to them.  Section IV introduces some princi-
ples of decision making and examines their implications for CRA.
5. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra notes 1-2.
6. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, Ranking Risks: Some Key Choices, in COMPARING ENVI-
RONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR SETTING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES 9 (J. Clarence Davies ed.,
1996).
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I. GOALS OF A CRA SHOULD AFFECT ITS DESIGN
As the Cheshire Cat pointed out to Alice, it does not matter
what path you take if you do not care where you go.  Similarly, the
best design for a CRA will depend on its goals.
CRAs may be (and have been) conducted in the furtherance of
several goals, including allocating government or social resources to
environmental threats, building a political consensus around a vision
of environmental protection, the developing of information, and edu-
cating of government officials, stakeholders, public-opinion leaders,
risk analysts, and citizens.  The scope of the analysis can vary both in
the domain of risks included and in the temporal perspective.  A mi-
cro-level analysis could compare risks of alternative disinfection
technologies for drinking water, or could guide the allocation of EPA
resources among hazardous air pollutants or toward the selection of
compounds for cancer bioassay through the National Toxicology
Program.  The early EPA reports are macro-scale, comparing risks
from global climate change, hazardous waste, indoor and outdoor air
pollution, drinking and surface waters, and other sources.  The EPA
analyses were restricted to risks over which the EPA has at least
some statutory authority; an even broader CRA might consider a full
range of risks to human health, safety, and the environment.  Simi-
larly, the temporal perspective of the analysis might range from set-
ting an agency’s budget or program activities for the next year to sus-
tainable development of the biosphere.
Appropriate design choices will depend on the goals of a CRA.
Figure 1 provides a stylized mapping from goal to choices on three
primary design criteria.  Three possible goals of a CRA are consid-
ered: efficient resource allocation, development of a political consen-
sus, and broader education of policy makers and citizens.  Within
each of the three design characteristics, two choices are offered: par-
ticipants may be technical experts or general citizens, the items
ranked may be risks or actions (opportunities for risk reduction), and
rankings may or may not be constrained by appeal to exogenous de-
cision-making principles.  While the illustrated goals and design op-
tions are only caricatures, Figure 1 highlights some of the possible
dependence of study design on goals.
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Figure 1:  Illustrative dependence of design choices on goal of CRA
Design Characteristic
Items Ranked Principles Participation
Goal of Analysis Risks      Actions Experts     Public Constrain   Open
Resource Allocation
Political consensus
Education
                    x
    x              x
    x              x
      x
                       x
                       x
        x
                         x
        x               x
In this article, “efficient resource allocation” means the maximi-
zation of risk reduction within resource limits.  The goal of efficient
resource allocation is likely to be best approached using a fairly tech-
nical CRA, conducted by experts rather than by members of the gen-
eral public, ranking available actions or opportunities for risk reduc-
tion rather than risks, and relying on decision-analytic principles to
facilitate and ensure the consistency of the ranking.  To some extent,
agreement on the goal of efficient risk reduction resolves issues of
preferences, in that risk reduction must be defined for the exercise to
proceed.  For example, risk could be defined in terms of lifetime mor-
tality risks from selected environmental causes or quality-adjusted
life years (QALYs) lost.  To the extent that other factors are to be
included in measuring risk, inputs can be obtained through existing
research on the structure of public preferences; for example, the sub-
stantial economic and medical literature on valuation of health risk
and environmental quality.7  The federal EPA analyses are examples
of this approach, although more formal, quantitative assessments
could also be undertaken.8
If the primary goal is to achieve political consensus or at least a
shared vision of the direction in which environmental, health, and
safety regulation should proceed within a political jurisdiction, it is
essential that elected representatives, stakeholders, and even
non-specialist members of the public be directly involved in generat-
ing the rankings.  Choices about the other design characteristics are
7. See A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS (1993); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to
Life and Health, 31 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1912 (1993); George Torrance, Measurement of
Health State Utilities for Economic Appraisal: A Review, 5 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 1 (1986);
MARTHE R. GOLD ET AL., COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE (1996).
8. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra notes 1-2.
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more flexible; it may be useful to rank either risks or actions (or
both), and principles of consistency may be given more or less atten-
tion as desired.  To the extent that a workable political agreement
which permits expeditious regulatory decisions is more important
than achieving some theoretical notion of optimality, the details of
what is agreed to become less important.  Note that it may be possi-
ble to achieve agreement on a ranking of actions without achieving
agreement on a ranking of risks, or vice versa.  Participants may be
able to agree on priorities among actions because they value different
attributes of the actions, such as risk reduction, job creation, symbol-
ism, and others; indeed, a great deal of legislative action involves
agreement (or at least compromise) on means without agreement on
desired ends.  Alternatively, agreement on ranking risks might gen-
erate some progress in resolving debates over actions by resolving or
at least removing some fundamental value issues from debate, al-
lowing the focus to turn to the question of how best to mitigate those
risks.
If the goal is simply one of educating the general public, stake-
holder groups, and/or elected representatives, again the choices of
what items are ranked and what principles imposed are less impor-
tant.  The arguments for ranking actions rather than risks and for im-
posing principled constraints on preferences deserve more attention
when the goal is education than when it is consensus building, be-
cause a goal of education is to enhance the sophistication with which
policy makers evaluate future risk decisions.  Many of the state and
local CRAs seem to have given higher priority to the consen-
sus-building and educational goals, and have consequently included
more public participation than the early national EPA studies.9
II. RANKING RISKS OR RISK-REDUCTION OPPORTUNITIES?
The original federal CRAs and most of the subsequent studies
have attempted to rank the risks resulting from various pollutants
and other sources that exist given current levels of control, often
designated “residual risks.”  While ranking risks is appealing at first
glance, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for allocating resources to
minimize exposure to risk.  Moreover, there is no apparent basis for
categorizing risks, and the categorization selected can affect the
ranking.  In contrast, ranking risk-reduction opportunities overcomes
9. See Minard, supra note 4, at 33-35.
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these problems, at least in principle.  In practice, however, ranking
actions requires much more information than does ranking risks, and
therefore ranking risks may be a useful substitute.
In order to maximize risk reduction given limited resources, risks
should be ranked by cost-effectiveness of available actions.  Figure 2
illustrates the magnitude of risk reduction achievable, as a function of
cost, for three hypothetical risks.  Under the current resource alloca-
tion, A poses the largest risk, followed by B then C.  Assume a small
quantity of additional resources can be devoted to reducing one or
more of these risks.  As illustrated, the maximum risk reduction will
be achieved by spending these resources on risk C, because the mar-
ginal cost-effectiveness of spending is larger than for either of the
other risks (the risk-cost curve is steeper for C than for the other
risks; marginal cost-effectiveness is the absolute value of the slope of
this curve).  Marginal cost-effectiveness is larger for risk A than for
B, so the correct ordering for minimizing risk would be C, A, B.
A second problem with ranking risks, rather than actions, is that
the ranking may depend on how risks are classified; there is no ra-
tionale for selecting the appropriate typology.  Risks can be classified
by the physical or chemical agent responsible (e.g., pesticides, ioniz-
ing radiation), by the human or natural activity generating the risk
(e.g., production of electricity, transportation), by the exposure
pathway (e.g., air, drinking water), or by other criteria.  Moreover,
the appropriate degree of aggregation is indeterminate.10  For exam-
ple, air pollution might rank relatively high, but if the class were
disaggregated into tropospheric ozone, particulates, carbon monox-
ide, and other hazardous pollutants, some of these would rank high
and others low.  Particulates might be further disaggregated between
large and small particulates (greater and smaller than 2.5 microns in
diameter, for example); small particulates would likely rank as a
more significant risk than large particulates.11
10. See John D. Graham et al., Refining the CRA Framework, in COMPARING ENVI-
RONMENTAL RISKS, supra note 6, at 93, 98.
11. See C. Arden Pope III et al., Health Effects of Particulate Air Pollution: Time for Reas-
sessment?, 103 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 472 (May 1995); Mary Amdur et al., Animal Toxicol-
ogy, in  PARTICLES IN OUR AIR: CONCENTRATIONS AND HEALTH EFFECTS 85 (Richard Wilson
& John Spengler eds., 1996).
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Figure 2:  Comparing risks and risk-reduction opportunities
In contrast, ranking risk-reduction opportunities provides sev-
eral advantages.  Problems of aggregation can be resolved by pre-
liminary analysis of the marginal or incremental cost-effectiveness of
opportunities and aggregating those with similar cost-effectiveness.
The aggregation can be subsequently refined if desirable.  In princi-
pal, all possible opportunities can be analyzed individually and ar-
ranged in order of decreasing marginal cost-effectiveness to produce
risk-abatement curves like those illustrated in Figure 2.  As an exam-
ple, Professor Tammy O. Tengs, et al. report cost-effectiveness of
more than 500 life-year-saving interventions involving control of
toxins, injury prevention, and medicine.12  In addition, analysis of
risk-reduction options allows one to incorporate effects of actions on
both the target risk and any countervailing or offsetting risks exacer-
bated by the action.13
12. See Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their
Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995).
13. See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in
RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 10-17
(John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
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The drawback to ranking risk-reduction opportunities is that it
requires substantially more information than does ranking risks.  In
addition to evaluating population exposure to risk factors and expo-
sure/risk relationships, it is necessary to consider the efficacy of risk
reduction technologies, countervailing risks, and costs of control.
Ranking risks can serve as a useful proxy and analytic short-cut to
ranking options if risk magnitude and marginal cost-effectiveness are
well correlated across risks (i.e., if the curves that start high in a plot
like Figure 2 are also the ones that fall most steeply).  This condition
will tend to hold when exposures of populations to risks can be re-
duced at similar costs, for example.
The choice between ranking risks and risk-reduction opportuni-
ties is an example of the general problem of choosing an evaluation
endpoint.  In many environmental-policy contexts, it is impossible to
reliably estimate the effect of different risk factors or policies on
endpoints that are of direct human concern; consequently, policies
are evaluated in terms of some proxy factor that is assumed to be re-
lated to the endpoints of interest and can be projected with greater
confidence.  In regulating possible chemical carcinogens, for exam-
ple, the relevant endpoint might be the distribution over the popula-
tion of the incremental probability of developing different forms of
cancer at various ages; in practice, a lifetime risk of any type of can-
cer is used instead.  In evaluating the risk of stratospheric-ozone de-
pletion due to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), relevant endpoints in-
clude the increases in human skin cancer, ocular damage, and effects
on wildlife from enhanced ultraviolet radiation.  Beginning with the
1974 discovery that CFCs might deplete ozone, total column ozone
loss (an idealized global average measure) was used as the evaluation
endpoint, on the assumption that greater ozone loss would allow
more ultraviolet radiation to reach the Earth’s surface.  Discovery of
the Antarctic ozone hole  made clear (a) that existing scientific mod-
els did not adequately explain global ozone patterns; and (b) that
seasonal and geographic variation in ozone depletion was much
greater than had been believed.14  The implication was that total col-
umn ozone was both less accurately projected and less relevant to
evaluating ultraviolet exposure to humans and wildlife than had been
thought.  Following this discovery, analyses of ozone depletion have
typically substituted the concentrations of chlorine and bromine in
14. See J.C., Farman et al., Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Seasonal
ClOx/NOx Interaction, 315 NATURE 207 (1985).
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the stratosphere (the agents responsible for ozone depletion) as the
evaluation endpoint.15
III. PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION
Health and environmental risks typically involve many attrib-
utes.  In addition to the probabilities of death, morbidity, and damage
to ecosystems, people may care about the extent of pain and suffer-
ing, the distribution of risk among people and whether it corresponds
to the distribution of benefits from the risk-generating activity, per-
ceived familiarity and controllability of the risk, and other factors.16
Moreover, individual preferences about risks and their association
with these factors may differ depending on available information, ex-
perience, political outlook, and other factors.  The multidimensional
nature of risk and heterogeneity in preferences raise issues about
whose preferences should be used in the CRA, and what information
should risk-rankers have available.
Developing a social ordering of risks is necessarily a matter of
compromise.  In his famous “impossibility theorem,” Kenneth J. Ar-
row showed that there is no social ordering of goods that satisfies
four seemingly reasonable criteria:
· Sensitivity to individual preferences.  If one individual shifts
his preference between A and B so that he ranks B superior
to A, the social ranking should not be changed to rank A
above B.
· Non-dictatorship.  The social ordering is not determined by a
single individual.
· Insensitivity to individual preferences.  If the social ordering
ranks A above B above C, removing B from the set does not
produce an ordering with C ranked above A.
15. See James K. Hammitt & Kimberly M. Thompson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, in THE
GREENING OF INDUSTRY: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 43, 84-85 (John D. Graham &
Jennifer K. Hartwell eds., 1997).
16. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);
Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE  280 (1987); Baruch Fischhoff, Risk: A Guide to
Controversy, in IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION 211 (National Research Council et al. eds.,
1989).
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· Universal domain.  The social ordering can be determined
for all possible combinations of individual rankings.17
For social allocations of benefits, it is conventional to distinguish
efficiency from distribution.  An allocation is (Pareto) efficient if
there is no reallocation such that no one in society prefers his lot be-
fore the reallocation than after.  Typically, a very large number of
allocations are efficient; in the problem of dividing a birthday cake
among partygoers, any division that leaves no cake on the serving
plate is efficient, regardless of whether the whole cake goes to one
gluttonous guest or is evenly divided among all of them.  Efficiency is
not, of course, the only goal, and people are often willing to give up
some efficiency for greater equity or other values.18
Knowledge and access to information about risks are likely to
vary widely within a population.  In performing a risk-ranking exer-
cise, it seems reasonable to propose that all relevant and reliable in-
formation about the risks should be provided to participants, subject
only to concerns about over-burdening them with information of sec-
ondary relevance.  Judgments about relevance and reliability are
likely to differ, however.  In the health-utility literature, preferences
over various disease and disability conditions are often characterized
using numerical values on a scale between zero (dead) and one
(perfect health).  Conditions of ill health are often viewed as less bad
by people who have those conditions than they are viewed by unaf-
fected people, perhaps because healthy people underestimate the ex-
tent to which they could adapt to disease or disability.19  This suggests
that a particular disease may rank differently depending on whether
the participants are those who suffer from the disease, those who do
not suffer from it, or those who do not suffer from it but who have
close contact with (or are otherwise informed by) those who do suffer
from it.
Reliability of information can also be controversial.  In particu-
lar, habits of framing scientific information can lead to different con-
clusions about reliability.  Consider a potential risk for which there is
limited evidence as to whether or not the risk even exists, such as the
carcinogenic effect of low-level exposure to certain chemicals.  As-
17. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963).
18. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975); Pe-
ter A. Ubel et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in a Setting of Budget Constraints, 334 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1174 (1996).
19. MARTHE R. GOLD ET AL., supra note 7, at 100.
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sume we wish to classify the chemical as carcinogenic if and only if
the probability that it will induce human cancer exceeds one per mil-
lion (for some specified exposure scenario).  Applying classical
(frequentist) statistics to the problem, the conclusion will depend on
what hypothesis is selected as the null or default.
This risk is not measurable using any practical experiment, and
so it is correct to say that there is no direct evidence of
(non-negligible) risk, but also no direct evidence of negligible risk.  In
a classical statistical hypothesis-testing analysis, the conclusion about
whether the risk exists or not may depend on how the problem is
framed: if the chemical is to be assumed non-hazardous unless there
is evidence of risk, it will be found safe; if the null hypothesis is that
the chemical is hazardous unless evidence shows the risk to be
smaller than some criterion, it will be found hazardous.  Conclusions
about the magnitude of the risk are necessarily subject to extrapola-
tions that cannot be adequately tested.
IV. PRINCIPLED CONSTRAINTS ON PREFERENCES
One way to define a consistent pattern of choices is in terms of
its adherence to a set of axioms of choice.  Axioms of choice are
statements about preferences that capture primitive and intuitively
compelling aspects of what we mean by consistency; choices violating
one or more accepted axioms would not be regarded as consistent.
If a specified set of risks (or of risk-reduction actions) can be
ranked, then the ranking must satisfy two axioms: asymmetry and
negative transitivity.  Asymmetry means that if A is ranked before B,
B cannot be ranked before A.20  At least in the abstract, the desir-
ability of complying with these axioms seems to be compelling, and
the fact that a ranking must satisfy both of them is intuitive.  What is
perhaps less intuitive is that if rankings among a pre-specified set of
risks satisfy both axioms, then a complete ranking can be obtained.
Such a ranking is called a “preference relation.”  Moreover, the
ranking can be represented by an ordinal utility function: a function
that assigns a numerical value to each risk such that one risk is
ranked higher than another if and only if its utility exceeds the utility
of the other risk.21
20. Negative transitivity means that if A is not ranked before B and B is not ranked before
C, then A is not ranked before C.  Equivalently, if A is ranked before B, C must be ranked be-
fore B or after A (or both).
21. See DAVID M. KREPS, NOTES ON THE THEORY OF CHOICE (1988).
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Because this utility function is ordinal (meaning only the order
of values counts, not their differences or ratios), any convenient scale
can be chosen.  One obvious scale is the rank itself (a utility function
can be defined so that a smaller rank is more preferred).  Other
scales could use monetary units, QALYs, or other metrics (additional
axioms beyond asymmetry and negative transitivity would be re-
quired for the differences in numbers of dollars or QALYs to be
meaningful).
The existence of a complete ranking implies that tradeoffs are
made among the attributes of each of the risks, and that preferences
over the attributes are revealed (at least in part) by choices.  For ex-
ample, if the loss of 100 million acres of wetland were ranked worse
than the extinction of one species of migratory songbird, which was
ranked worse than the loss of 1 million acres of wetland, one could
infer that the appropriate tradeoff between acres of wetland loss and
extinction of songbirds is at a ratio somewhere between 1 million and
100 million to one.
Tradeoffs among quantitative and qualitative risk attributes have
been examined by various scholars.22  Professors Maureen L. Cropper
and Uma Subramanian used nationwide survey data to examine pref-
erences among lives saved from various public health and environ-
mental risks, characteristics of the risks, and characteristics of the
government programs.  In hypothetical choices among programs
saving various numbers of lives, they found that choices depended on
characteristics of the risks and of the programs.  Respondents were
more likely to select a program saving fewer lives if the risk from
which the lives were saved was more serious, less controllable, and if
the respondent was exposed to the risk.  Respondents were also more
likely to choose a program saving fewer lives if the program was
viewed as likely to be effective, if it was likely to be an appropriate
intervention for government to undertake, if the funding was per-
ceived as fair, and if the program would yield benefits relatively
22. See MAUREEN L. CROPPER & UMA SUBRAMANIAN, PUBLIC CHOICES BETWEEN
LIFESAVING PROGRAMS: HOW IMPORTANT ARE LIVES SAVED? (The World Bank, Policy Re-
search Working Paper No. 1497, August 1995); Timothy L. McDaniels, Comparing Expressed
and Revealed Preferences for Risk Reduction: Different Hazards and Question Frames, 8 RISK
ANALYSIS 593 (1988); Timothy L. McDaniels et al., Risk Perception and the Value of Safety, 12
RISK ANALYSIS 495 (1992); Ian Savage, An Empirical Investigation into the Effect of Psycho-
logical Perceptions on the Willingness-to-Pay to Reduce Risk, 6 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
75 (1993); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Pricing Environmental Health Risks: Survey Assessments of
Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs for Chronic Bronchitis, 21 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
32 (1991).
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quickly.  The effects of differences in risk and program attributes
were quantitatively significant: in some cases, the median respondent
would require twice as many lives to be saved by one program (e.g.,
reducing radon exposure in homes) to prefer it to another program
(either a workplace smoking ban or a pesticide ban on fruit).  Moreo-
ver, as many as 30 to 40% of respondents were estimated to prefer
one program to another saving 20 to 100 times as many lives (e.g.,
smoking education versus control of industrial air-pollution; co-
lon-cancer screening versus control of drinking-water pollution).
A number of potential violations of choice axioms have been
identified that may be relevant to a CRA.  In some cases, the viola-
tion appears to be unacceptable: there is no compelling set of axioms
that would justify the violation.  In others, the normative significance
is less clear: the axioms may fail to capture important aspects of a de-
cision, and therefore their violation is justified.  Four potential viola-
tions are described below.
A. Framing Effects
Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have identified
a number of apparent violations of choice axioms that they explain as
systematic results of reliance on heuristic decision rules.  One of the
most prominent and troubling of these violations is the effect of
framing: human choice may depend critically on the way in which a
question is posed, even when the alternative questions are logically
equivalent.23 In one well-known example, Tversky and Kahneman
posed the following problem:
· Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an un-
usual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. . . .
· [Lives Saved:]  If program A is adopted, 200 people will be
saved. . . .  If program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability
that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no
people will be saved. . . .
23. See Amos Tversky  & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases,  185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 291 (1979).
94 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 8:81
· [Lives Lost:]  If program C is adopted 400 people will die. . . .
If program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody
will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.24
Responses to the different question frames (by different samples
of people) are clearly inconsistent.  In the first question frame, 72%
of respondents choose A over B, saving 200 people for sure rather
than gambling on saving all of them with one-third probability.  In
the second framing, almost the same fraction—78%—prefer D to C,
gambling on saving all 600 rather than letting 400 die for sure.25  The
existence of framing effects poses an important challenge to CRA,
since it is important to ensure that rankings are not sensitive to logi-
cally equivalent ways of presenting the risks.
B.  Sensitivity to Scope
Tradeoffs between attributes, whether implicit or explicit, should
generally depend on the magnitudes of the changes in attribute lev-
els.  The amount of a valued attribute that one should be willing to
give up for an improvement in another attribute should depend on
the magnitude of the improvement.  This assumption has received ex-
tensive scrutiny in the context of giving up money (willingness to pay
or WTP) for improvements in health and environmental quality.  In
particular, the validity of a prominent method of eliciting preferences
for diverse goods—Contingent Valuation—has been questioned be-
cause the resulting estimates of WTP do not seem to be sufficiently
sensitive to the magnitude of the improvement in environmental
quality.
Contingent Valuation (CV) attempts to elicit preferences by
asking survey respondents either to state the maximum amount of
money they would pay for a certain specified change in environ-
mental conditions or other goods, or to choose between two options
differing in cost and environmental quality.  In some cases, CV-based
estimates of WTP for environmental improvements do not appear to
be sufficiently sensitive to the magnitude of the improvement.  In one
example, respondents were asked their WTP (in the form of higher
prices) for wire-net covers to protect migratory waterfowl from being
24.  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59
J. OF BUS. 251, 260 (1986).
25.  Id.
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killed by landing in waste-oil holding ponds in the Central Flyway (a
region including parts of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico).  Dif-
ferent subsets of respondents were told that the covers would prevent
different numbers of birds from dying each year: 2,000, 20,000, and
200,000 (the numbers were supplemented by descriptions as “much
less than 1%,” “less than 1%,” and “about 2%” of the 8 million wa-
terfowl migrating along this route annually).  The estimated WTP for
the three levels of environmental improvement were $59, $59, and
$71, respectively.26  The small differences in WTP compared with the
100-fold variation in number of birds saved leads some commentators
to suggest that CV did not accurately measure tradeoffs between
wealth and environmental quality in this instance.27
It is not clear exactly how WTP should relate to the number of
birds protected in this example.  A naive assumption might be that
WTP should be proportional to the number of birds saved, yielding a
100-fold difference in WTP between the 2,000 and 200,000 bird sce-
narios.  The usual assumption of diminishing marginal rates of substi-
tution would suggest that WTP should increase less than in propor-
tion to the number of birds saved.  Considering the number of living
birds as the relevant attribute of the situation, rather than the num-
ber of birds saved, suggests that WTP should be increase more than
proportionately to the number of birds saved, since the scenarios
then represent increases in population to 8,000,000 from 7,998,000,
7,980,000, and 7,800,000, respectively.28  Alternatively, the attribute of
greatest concern may not be the number of birds affected but rather
the fact that free-living birds are being killed in waste-oil ponds; in
that case, perhaps WTP should not be sensitive to the number of
birds affected.
For human mortality risks, economic theory provides a stronger
justification for the appropriate tradeoff between risk reduction and
WTP.  If the marginal value of wealth is greater to an individual if he
is alive than if he is dead, WTP for a small reduction in mortality risk
(within the next year or other time period) is positive and should be
nearly proportional to the magnitude of the reduction in mortality
probability.  For otherwise similar individuals with different levels of
26. See William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contin-
gent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993).
27. Id; see also Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some
Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 45, 51-52 (1993).
28. See Peter A. Diamond, Testing the Internal Consistency of Contingent Valuation Sur-
veys 30 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT. 337 (1996).
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wealth or different levels of mortality risk within some time period,
the one with the larger wealth or the larger period-mortality risk
should have larger WTP for the same risk reduction.  WTP may fall
substantially below proportionality to the risk reduction only when
the reduction is so large that the payment causes substantial loss of
income.29
C.  Risk Aversion and Equity
In some cases, seemingly desirable attributes are in direct con-
flict.  Such is the case with a desire for equitable risk distributions
within a population and risk aversion over the number of deaths from
the risk.
Consider two distributions of mortality risk, summarized in Fig-
ure 3.  In case A, each of the 1,000 residents of a community face
probabilistically independent 1/1,000 mortality risks from a specified
cause.  In case B, two residents face a 1/2 mortality risk from a speci-
fied cause; the other 998 residents face no risk.  Assuming that the
benefits of whatever activity produces the risk are widespread, Case
A appears to be far more equitable; case B imposes extremely large
risks on two unfortunate individuals.
In both cases, the expected number of deaths from the risk is
one.  The worst-case outcomes are very different: in case B, the worst
outcome is two deaths; in case A, all 1,000 people could die from the
risk (although the probability is vanishingly small—10-3000).  The prob-
ability that no one dies from the risk is substantially larger in case A
than in case B (0.37 and 0.25, respectively).  The probability that
more than two people die from the risk is zero in case B but almost
0.08 in case A; however, the probability that more than four people
die in case A is less than 0.003.  Taking into account only the prob-
abilities of numbers of deaths, not the interpersonal distribution of
risks, case B appears to be more attractive; technically, it can be
shown that risk aversion over the number of deaths (preferring N
deaths for certain to a gamble with N expected deaths) implies a
preference for B over A.  More generally, Professor Ralph Keeney
has shown that a preference for equitable distribution of risks and
29. See Michael Jones-Lee, The Value of Changes in the Probability of Death or Injury, 82
J. OF POL. ECON. 835 (1974); Milton C. Weinstein et al., The Economic Value of Changing
Mortality Probabilities: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 94 Q. J. OF ECON. 373 (1980); John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Willingness to Pay and the Distribution of Risk and Wealth, 4 J.
OF POL. ECON. 747 (1996).
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risk-aversion over the number of deaths are fundamentally incom-
patible: a preference for equity implies a risk-seeking preference over
the number of deaths.30
Figure 3:  Alternative Distributions of Mortality Risk
                                                                       Probability
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A:  1,000 people face
independent 1/1,000 risk
B:  2 people face
independent ½ risk,
998 face no risk
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D. Uncertainty Aversion and Learning from Experience
Studies of the factors affecting tolerance or acceptability of risks
have often found that uncertainty about the risk, sometimes in the
form of unfamiliarity about technology, makes a risk less accept-
able.31  In decision theory, uncertainty aversion leads to the Ellsberg
Paradox: people prefer a lottery with known odds over a similar lot-
tery with unknown odds.32  Consider two choices of gambles involving
which color ball will be drawn from an urn containing 300 balls, of
which 100 are known to be red and 200 are known to be blue or yel-
low (but the division between blue and yellow balls is unknown).
Given the choice of winning $1,000 if a red ball or a blue ball is
drawn, many respondents prefer to bet on red.  Given the choice of
winning $1,000 if either (a) a red or yellow ball is drawn, or if (b) a
blue or yellow ball is drawn, the same respondents often prefer to bet
on blue or yellow, however.
30. See Ralph Keeney, Utility Functions for Equity and Public Risk, 26 MGMT. SCI. 345
(1980).
31. See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280 (1987).
32. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. OF ECON. 643
(1961).
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As shown in Figure 4, such preferences appear to reflect incon-
sistent estimates of the mixture of blue and yellow balls in the urn.  If
one thinks there are more blue than yellow balls, the probability P of
drawing a blue ball is greater than 1/3, so one should bet on the sec-
ond choice in each gamble (blue; blue or yellow); alternatively, if one
thinks there are more yellow than blue balls, he should bet on the
first choice in each gamble.  If, as seems reasonable, he has no idea
whether there are more blue than yellow balls, he should not have a
strong preference on which side of the bets he takes.
Figure 4:  The Ellsberg Paradox
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P
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2/3 - P
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$0
$0
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$0
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P
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$0
$0
$1,000
$1,000
$1,000
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In many cases, uncertainty about a risk can be a reason to choose
that risk over a more certain one, if exposure to the uncertain risk
yields information that is useful for subsequent decisions.  Consider
the choice between an innovative, unfamiliar technology and a stan-
dard, reliable technology for remediating Superfund sites.  Assume
both technologies cost the same to apply.  The innovative technology
will work with probability P; if so, it will completely remove the
health and environmental risks associated with the site (risk reduc-
tion = 1); if it fails, it will yield no risk reduction (risk reduction = 0).
The standard technology reduces the risk by an amount V, some-
where between 0 and 1.
If the goal of the program is to maximize the cumulative risk re-
duction across sites, the appropriate choice between the innovative
and standard technologies will depend on the number of future sites
at which these technologies will be applicable.  If there is only one
site at which the decision is to be made, the expected risk reduction is
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maximized by choosing the innovative technology if and only if P ex-
ceeds V.  If the success of the innovative technology at the first site is
a perfect indicator of whether it will work at future sites, it is worth
choosing the innovative technology at the first site to obtain this in-
formation.  If the technology works, it can then be used with confi-
dence at all future sites where it is applicable; if it fails, the standard
technology should be used at all future sites.
The value of information obtained by trying the innovative tech-
nology can be quite large.  If the probability of success is one-half and
there is only one additional site where the new technology may be
used, it should be selected for the first site if V < 2/3.  If there are
nine additional sites at which the new technology is applicable, it
should be tried unless the standard technology provides almost com-
plete remediation (V > 10/11 . 0.91). As shown by Figure 5, if there
are more than 10 or so sites at which this decision must be made, it is
better to choose the innovative technology at the first site unless the
probability that it will succeed is small, or the remediation provided
by the standard technology is nearly complete.  The larger the num-
ber of sites involved, the more valuable it is to learn that the innova-
tive technology works, and therefore the bigger the risk of failure one
should accept on the first try.33
Figure 5:  Choosing Between Innovative and Standard Technologies
33. For N sites total, the innovative technology should be selected if P > [1 + N (1 - V)/V]-1
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V.  SUMMARY
Comparative Risk Analysis encompasses a range of study de-
signs addressing a broad set of goals.  Several key design issues have
been considered, including whether risks or risk-reduction actions are
the items that are ranked; the mix of participants between technical
risk assessors and representatives of the general public; and the ex-
tent to which rankings should be informed by decision-analytic prin-
ciples.  The best design for a CRA will depend on the goals it is in-
tended to address, but in many cases it will be useful to at least
consider the implications of decision-analytic principles.  Violations
of some principles, as in the sensitivity of choices to problem framing,
appear to be unjustifiable. Care should be taken in conducting CRAs
to test for and alleviate these violations.  Other violations, such as
apparent inadequate sensitivity to scope, may be justified, but the
findings of a CRA will be strengthened if such violations are identi-
fied and justified through reasoned argument rather than overlooked
in haste or ignorance.
